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When is normative recruitment 
legitimate?
Lars Øystein Ursin and Berge Solberg
Rosamond Rhodes and John Harris have both recently argued that we all have 
a general moral duty to participate in medical research. However, neither 
Rhodes’ nor Harris’ arguments in support of this obligation stand up to scru-
tiny, and severe and convincing criticism has been levelled against their case. 
Still, to refute their arguments is not to refute the conclusion. There seems to 
be some truth in the view that when people are asked to take part in medical 
research, their choice is not completely morally neutral. In this article, we 
argue that the proper question to ask is when, rather than if, a certain moral 
duty to volunteer for medical research can be appealed to. To answer this ques-
tion, we need a denser description of relevant research projects and their con-
text rather than just describing medical research in general. Drawing on our 
study of participants in the Norwegian HUNT biobank, we use the normative 
implications of the Norwegian concept «dugnad» as an analogy to discuss the 
requirement of providing neutral information to potential biobank partici-
pants in order to promote their free and informed decision as to whether or not 
to take part. We suggest that normative recruitment is not just a question of 
principles and ethics. It is also a question of research design and the creation 
of the common good in the community where the research takes place.
Keywords: autonomy, biobanking, dugnad, normative recruitment, rese-
arch ethics
A general duty to participate in medical research
In an attempt to interpret anew the autonomy and obligations of partici-
pants in biobank research, Rosamond Rhodes makes a frontal attack on
contemporary research ethics in her article ‘Rethinking research ethics’
Etikk i praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2008), 2 (2), s. 93–113. 
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(Rhodes 2005: 7). According to Rhodes, in bioethical literature, informed
consent is argued for on the basis of an ambiguous concept of autonomy. On
the one hand, autonomy is taken as an ideal for the individual. The ideal,
then, is that the foundation for an individual’s choice is freedom and reflec-
tion. On the other hand, autonomy is taken to be a norm for how an indivi-
dual’s choices are to be understood.
While such a norm demands an assumption that an individual makes
autonomous choices, according to Rhodes the opposite position is preva-
lent in bioethics literature. The norm of autonomy is replaced by the ideal,
which drastically restricts the kinds of people who can truly be said to be
autonomous. In this manner, the kinds of people who are genuinely auto-
nomous, able to give an informed consent and to take part in research, are
separated from those who do not possess these qualities, and who are con-
sequently excluded from research.
Rhodes accentuates autonomy as a social norm, and argues against the
exclusion of groups of people as participants in research on the basis of an
ideal of autonomy. Indeed, everybody should take part in research, Rhodes
argues, because the vulnerable aspect in this context is the future patient
rather than the present research participant. Further, to assume that it is
against the will and interests of people to take part in a morally laudable and
other-regarding project, such as improving medicine through research, is
for Rhodes deeply disrespectful (Rhodes 2005: 14). She states the implica-
tion of her views on autonomy, regarding research participation thus: «So,
in light of our appreciation of human vulnerability to injury and disease and
our appreciation of the value of clinical research, reasonable people should
endorse policies that make research participation a social duty» (Rhodes
2005:15).
On the basis of these considerations, Rhodes puts forward a novel pro-
posal: her idea is that society, after thorough deliberation, should institute
obligatory participation in medical research at regular intervals for all citi-
zens. The choice is then not if one wants to participate in a study or not, but
which study to participate in. All studies would have to be approved by
public medical authorities. This would draw attention to the approval pro-
cess and would require full disclosure of the study design in order for insti-
tutions to be judged trustworthy by prospective participants. Projects
should also be deemed of high quality and importance, and with few or no
inexpedient burdens placed on participants. The granting of informed con-
sent in this context would be part of the active exercise of one’s autonomy,
inside a field restricted by law.
Rhodes aims to establish medical research as one of society’s central
tasks. From this perspective, it follows that the demand that all research
should be of direct benefit to participants undermines its social and long-
term purposes. In the regulation and evaluation of specific research pro-
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jects, it is important to focus on the quality of the research, and to maintain
legitimate trust on the part of participants. By making autonomy and parti-
cipation the norm, the default position for Rhodes is that everybody can
and will contribute to the common good resulting from medical research.
Sarah Chan and John Harris shares Rhodes’ view of the default position.
They do not, however, think that this justifies conscription of participants
to medical research (Chan & Harris 2008: 11). Harris likewise discusses in
the article ‘Scientific research is a moral duty’ the question of a putative duty
to participate in research as a moral question, and not a juridical or a poli-
tical one (Harris 2005). In this article he emphasises two principles, both of
which he thinks commit us to a moral obligation to participate in medical
research. The first principle is our moral duty not to harm others. Harris
argues that such harm is the consequence of declining to contribute to this
kind of research. The second principle is the principle of justice, which
results in the problem of the freerider.
Harris does not argue for any legal duty to take part in research, but
holds that these principles make it ethically problematic to refuse participa-
tion. To participate is required, both to contribute to the common good and
to be able to respect oneself as a moral actor. On this basis, it is possible to
presume that a safeguarded participation also would be in the interests of
those deemed to be without full competence to consent. Harris concludes:
«There is then a moral obligation to participate in research in certain con-
texts. This will obviously include minimally invasive and minimally risky
procedures such as participation in biobanks, provided safeguards against
wrongful use are in place» (Harris 2005: 247).
Perfect and imperfect duties
Although the views put forward by Rhodes and Harris touch upon somet-
hing important, their arguments are far from unproblematic, as shown by
the debate and criticism sparked by their articles.1 John Harris argues, for
instance, that to choose not to participate in medical research conflicts with
the principle of fairness. Non-participants are illegitimate freeriders if they
later benefit from the research by receiving improved health care. In making
this argument, however, Harris overlooks the fact that even non-partici-
pants pay for the health care they receive through taxation or insurance pre-
miums, and that they also have no choice but to benefit from research-
based health care. Furthermore, it can be argued that one of the benefits of
modern society is precisely a kind of institutionalised freeriding in the form
of division of labour. This makes it unnecessary (and unfeasible) for every-
body to take part in any kind of research from which we might possibly
benefit.2
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A similar kind of objection has been made to Harris’s use of the principle
of a duty to help others by taking part in medical research (Brassington
2007; Sharpsay & Pimple 2007). Sharpsay and Pimple invoke the Kantian
notion of imperfect moral duties as the most precise way to describe the
relevant obligation here: «participation in medical research per se is not
morally obligatory, but neither is it supererogatory; it is one way in which
people may choose to discharge their imperfect obligation to help others.»
(Sharpsay & Pimple 2007) A perfect moral obligation always to help others
would make our lives unmanageable, as we are finite beings with limited
means. Furthermore, because participating in medical research is only one
of many ways to help others in need, it can at most be argued to be an imper-
fect obligation to take part.3
For Rhodes, consenting to take part in medical research is to contribute
to the common good. The debate on informed consent for, or a compulsory
participation in, medical research, must therefore take place in the context
of a common understanding of the common good. However, in a pluralistic
and liberal society, such a consensus is not necessarily reached, or even
aimed at (London 2005; Sharp & Yarborough 2005). Different answers will
be obtained for questions such as: What are the merits of good health? What
constitutes good health? Do biobank research and other medical research
promote public health in the right way?
Rhodes’s system of mandatory research participation entails a limited
obligation to take part in research projects. Even such a limited obligation
is, however, hard to uphold. As argued by Robert Wachbroit and David
Wasserman,
[R]esearch participation should be seen as a valuable civic activity, like school tuto-
ring, volunteer fire-fighting, and neighbourhood patrolling. Like those other activi-
ties, it is a way for individuals to serve a community from which they derive many
benefits. It should be encouraged and praised like those other activities, but there is
no reason to single it out as the subject of a universal duty. (Wachbroit & Wasserman
2005: 48–49)
This line of argument removes medical research from the prominent posi-
tion that compels Rhodes and Harris to see it as subject to a duty to take
part. For both Rhodes and Harris, the prominent position of medical rese-
arch establishes a duty to take part based on intergenerational fairness: we
have an obligation not only to maintain the present level of medical care but
also to improve it through research for the sake of future generations, just
as preceding generations by their research participation have made the
present level of medical care possible.
Such an imperative to undertake research should stem from the moral
obligation we have to help alleviate the suffering of today and tomorrow.
However, for the research imperative to be a moral obligation, i.e. somet-
   When is normative recruitment legitimate? 97
Lars Øystein Ursin and Berge Solberg
hing we must do, failure to carry out medical research must not only harm
people, it must also be indispensable in avoiding (future) harm. However,
in his book What price better health? Daniel Callahan questions both of
these assumptions. In countering the argument that more medical research
is indispensable in avoiding (future) harm, Callahan reminds us that hel-
ping others by participating in medical research is only one aspect of our
vision of a good society. The provision of social security, proper education,
family welfare, and so forth – along with improving health care – is a neces-
sary, but not sufficient condition for fulfilling this vision. It is also impor-
tant not to mistake social and cultural problems for medical problems.
Callahan does not accept the assumption that we have a duty to develop
more effective medical treatments for future generations. In support of his
view, he quotes Hans Jonas:
The destination of research is essentially melioristic [The belief that improvement of
society depends on human effort.]. It does not serve the preservation of the existing
good from which I profit myself and to which I am obligated. Unless the present state
is intolerable, the melioristic goal is in a sense gratuitous, and this not only from the
vantage point of the present. (Callahan 2003)
Callahan, like Sharpsay and Pimple, thus classifies medical research as an
imperfect moral duty.
The dugnad concept
The questions of both intergenerational and intragenerational justice are,
however, pertinent in the promotion of medical progress, unless one dis-
misses any duty to contribute to such progress, as Callahan does. Further,
in opposition to Callahan, Rhodes aims to make medical research a
common good that is part of a larger social contract.
Another way of thinking about this is that such an understanding can be
created for every research project. It is the research project – through its
design, context and intention – that has to construct and establish the com-
mon good, in order to justify normative recruitment. In the following, we
will explore this idea by taking a closer look at a specific medical research
project and a particular way of describing participation in the project. This
exploration aims to make possible a more nuanced view of the way in which
participation in medical research should be taken to be a perfect or an
imperfect duty – or no duty at all. Thereafter, the implications of the answer
to this question regarding the recruitment of participants will be pursued.
The Norwegian health study and biobank research project HUNT4 is
referred to by policymakers as the largest health dugnad in Norway – or
even in the world.5 HUNT is one of the largest existing projects in genetic
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epidemiology in the world. Yet what does the Norwegian word dugnad
mean, and how does it relate to participation in health surveys and biobank
research?
The dugnad concept stems historically from pre-industrial Norwegian
farm regions. In these regions, the farms were rather small, the produce was
consumed by the farming people themselves, and the market for goods and
labour was limited. To undertake tasks such as roofing and haymaking,
which were uncomplicated tasks but required a great deal of labour over a
short time, farmers had to rely on a circle of neighbours to take turns in hel-
ping them. This kind of work was unpaid, but the farmer who benefited
from the work was expected to treat the people who came to help by serving
good food and beverages on the day of the dugnad, and maybe even to host
a party for his workers.
According to a standard definition, «dugnad refers to when the neigh-
bours of a farmer gather at his farm to help him to accomplish a large task,
without being paid» (Østberg 1926). The traditional dugnad concept exclu-
ded communal and legal duties, and singled out the kind of informal duties
that involved taking turns in helping one another. The dugnad institution
relied on a mutual understanding of reciprocity between farmers who were
equal in economic terms and the «relation of reciprocity comprised of gene-
rations» (Norddølum 1976; 1980).
New technology, increased trade and social differentiation led to the dis-
appearance of the structural conditions for the traditional dugnad system in
Norway in the first half of the 20th century (Klepp 2001: 84). The dugnad
concept, however, has survived and is still widely in use in Norway (Klepp
1982: 92; Norddølum 1976: 72f). Today, the activities that come under the
heading of dugnad are different from the original dugnad work, but share
certain aspects of the «good old» dugnad or maybe just the «dugnad spirit».
From an international perspective, the Finnish concept of «talkoot», and
the American concepts of a «bee» or «barn raising», both have a similar
meaning to the Norwegian concept of the dugnad. The authors of this arti-
cle learned this from the entry for dugnad in the Norwegian version of
Wikipedia – an international project6 which might be termed «the largest
dugnad ever», not in the sense of a system of reciprocity, but in the sense of
making people contribute to the common good motivated by personal
pride and solidarity without any economic gain. The Wikipedia project
illustrates that invoking the «dugnad spirit» can be used to motivate and
describe phenomena worldwide.
The dugnad spirit denotes that the values of liberty, equality and frater-
nity are actively promoted by a group and its members in freely committing
themselves to work together as equals for the benefit of all. Today, dugnad
is first and foremost associated with volunteering to do unpaid work for the
common good. To be able to term something a dugnad, and to take part in
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a dugnad, is to make the activity morally praiseworthy. The dugnad spirit is
then seen as a manifestation of an unselfish attitude that runs counter to a
disintegrating society based on purely contractual relationships, and emp-
hasises a spontaneous solidarity that is seen as both a moral ideal and the
glue of society.
To benefit from or to take part in a dugnad should be motivated by a sha-
red and acquired social conscience rather than by calculations of profit or
from fear of sanctions. Helge Norddølum gives an example of an exploita-
tion of the dugnad institution when a wealthy farmer in the Norwegian
county of Valdres arranged a dugnad to build a mountain hotel (Norddølum
1976: 72f). The dugnad principle of reciprocity was thereby violated, as the
hotel owners obviously did not, nor would not, help participants build their
own hotels. The dugnad spirit of solidarity was also illegitimately invoked,
as these hotels were built by unpaid workers in order to profit the owners.
The obligations associated with an economy of mutual dependence were
taken advantage of by entrepreneurs operating in a market economy sys-
tem. Nonetheless, as the example of the Icelandic commercial biobank pro-
ject deCODE7 shows, invoking a kind of dugnad spirit does not exclude
economic profit from the dugnad result, if it is seen as beneficial for the
community in which people regard themselves as belonging to.
In this article we discuss the dugnad model in relation to recruitment to
biobank research. The salient features of the model is the equality of the
participants, an element of non-economic personal interest or gain in
taking part, a system of reciprocity, the invocation of civic duties and com-
munal solidarity, and the pursuit of a common good – including communal
prosperity. In addition, the tasks of a dugnad should not to be complicated
or risky in such a way that places undue burdens on the participants. The
tasks and outcomes of the dugnad should not be controversial. Only if it is
reasonable to expect everybody to be able to attend, and have no moral
qualms about participating, is it possible to blame people for not showing
up.
The dugnad model invites a description of both the motivation and jus-
tification for biobank recruitment that is more nuanced and integrated than
just pointing to aspects such as ethical or legal obligations, altruism and gift
donation, economic profit, or personal interest. To invite others to a dugnad
places an obligation on the host to make sure that the dugnad criteria are
fulfilled. The project should form part of a system of reciprocity which pro-
motes communal solidarity and the common good. No requirement of spe-
cial skills or potential for harm should prevent anybody from taking part.
In this way, a dugnad project should act as an incarnation of citizenship and
the ethics of belonging to a community.
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Biobank participation
Does the analogy of dugnad serve as a means to achieving a more adequate
description of what participation in medical research in general and
biobank research in particular entails? We take the HUNT study as a star-
ting point for a general discussion of the relevance and implications of
introducing the dugnad analogy to this field.
In total, 110,000 people in the Norwegian county of Nord-Trøndelag
have been or will be invited to take part in HUNT3, the third round of
HUNT studies taking place in the period 2006–2008. The HUNT cohort
consists of a major part of the population of the county of Nord-Trøndelag.
All citizens aged 13 or older have been invited to participate in HUNT by
completing a questionnaire on health-related issues, undergoing optional
medical tests, and (from HUNT2 onward) allowing a blood sample to be
taken and included in the HUNT biobank.
In the previous HUNT study in the 1980s (HUNT1) and the HUNT2
study in the 1990s, the participation rates were 88.1% and 71.3% of the adult
population, respectively (Holmen et al. 2004). The participation rate in
HUNT3 is expected to be c.60%. Even if the participation rate is declining,
these figures show that the majority of the people of Nord-Trøndelag not
only support the research project but actually decide to take part. Steinar
Krokstad, vice-chairman of the HUNT research centre, explains the wil-
lingness to participate in this way: «In Nord-Trøndelag, there is traditio-
nally a strong belief in the power of cooperation and collective action. Coo-
peration has been strong, and when HUNT has invited people to participate
in a health dugnad, they have shown up.» (Krokstad 2004)
Krokstad goes on to state that «modern society is characterised by the
disintegration of the community», and that the HUNT dugnad will contri-
bute to counteract this development in a threefold way. Firstly, HUNT by
itself promotes the dugnad spirit in its participants, secondly, HUNT might
be able to detect adverse health consequences of societal disintegration, and
thirdly, HUNT promotes collective action for improved public health:
The people of Nord-Trøndelag can be the first to benefit from new ways to better
public health, through knowledge that can be communicated to the whole world in
international journals. […] Norway has developed from a poor country with a lot of
poor health and living conditions to be a country with the best public health in the
world. The Universal Health Insurance and the social security net that protects us
from poverty are based on the old principles of equality, liberty and fraternity. And
these institutions still contribute to good public health. (Krokstad 2004)
The fall in participation rate between HUNT1, HUNT2 and HUNT3 indi-
cates that the dugnad spirit has declined in Nord-Trøndelag. In this article
we will not speculate on why this is so, but rather note that in HUNT (as in
many other projects worldwide) there is a need for normative recruitment
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in order to secure a high attendance rate. The crucial question then
becomes whether normative recruitment is always wrong and incompatible
with the ideals of modern research ethics, or whether in a case like HUNT
it is legitimate.
In a focus group study with HUNT researchers we asked whether bio-
bank participants should have priority in receiving public health care over
those who do not participate.8 No one thought this should be the case, but
one researcher expressed the general sentiment towards those who do not
participate rather succinctly by remarking «they should maybe search their
consciences». Another researcher elaborated on this remark when asked
whether biobank participation should be a legal duty:
I think that everybody has a moral duty to participate. And I think that Norwegians
in general see it this way, and that the participation rate in HUNT shows that the
people in Nord-Trøndelag see it this way. To participate should not be a legal duty,
since it interferes with the private sphere. But I think there are few people who would
oppose participation in HUNT if the collective goods it entails are clearly stated, and
that we all agree that such a study should be a part of our collective efforts to improve
our health service.
In this respect, the concept of dugnad has the potential both to clarify and
obscure the balancing of privacy rights, civic duties and legal duties. We will
show how by identifying the determining factors present in both the HUNT
and MIDIA9 research projects.
Is HUNT a dugnad?
The word dugnad does not explicitly appear in the official information
material for HUNT. However, the dugnad spirit is evoked in the way that
HUNT motivates people to participate, thus this analogy seems to be clearly
warranted. In an information folder for HUNT3 we read:
Something very important for public health is happening in our county right now!
You can contribute to vital research and increased knowledge about diseases which
are of concern to us all. […] We have every reason to be proud of HUNT. HUNT is
the largest health survey of the world. […] Please participate! Let’s give each other
an hour for better public health!
The request to give «each other an hour for better public health» refers to the
time it takes to complete the HUNT questionnaire and give a blood sample.10
From this perspective, the participants contribute mainly by giving their time.
The risk of participation is conceived of as negligible, and the participants are
not asked to make huge sacrifices: they will leave the research centre in the
same shape as before – except without a few centilitres of blood.
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Thus, the participants are primarily asked to do a little unpaid work: to
show up and take time to answer questions, and allow for health data and a
blood sample to be obtained. It is work in the sense that participation is not
for personal health purposes: no individual feedback is provided on the
basis of biobank research findings. When the participants have done their
share, the job is finished. In this way, participants are considered to be con-
tributing as citizens rather than as patients. Moreover, the work is unpaid in
the sense that except for the free brief health check, there is no compensa-
tion given to participants.
HUNT could be said to be a dugnad in the modern sense of being a gat-
hering of people to do unpaid work for some kind of common good. Of course,
both the «gathering» and the «common good» might be said to be quite
abstract in this case: like Wikipedia contributors, the participants do not
actually gather at one place. For the participants, the common good is also
vaguely conceivable rather than directly perceivable. Moreover, the partici-
pants are, as we will see, a little uncomfortable regarding their contribution
as «work». Given the fact that the free personal health check offered by
HUNT motivates some people to take part makes it contestable to call their
participation «work», and even debateable if the participation is wholly
«unpaid». Moreover, the participants in both a traditional and a modern
dugnad enjoy benefits such as good food and beverages, but these kinds of
benefits are not of the same personal nature as an individual health check.
HUNT could also be said to be a dugnad in the traditional sense of offe-
ring an intergenerational system of reciprocation between equal parties: no
HUNT participant is more important than another, everybody contributes
in more or less the same way, and everybody can expect the same kind of
possible benefit from the research from an intergenerational perspective.
This emphasises how both the HUNT study and the traditional dugnad can
be viewed as a kind of insurance institution. In this respect, however, a
major disparity would be that while stepping outside the traditional dugnad
institution might have implied grave and direct social and economic conse-
quences for a farmer in the 19th century, a person declining to take part in
the HUNT study today should, as a matter of principle, expect no personal
consequences from his or her decision when it comes to the future provi-
sion of health care. It is an important part of the HUNT recruitment policy,
however, to appeal to the direct personal gain from having a free health
check. In this way, participation is not purely altruistic – there is «somet-
hing in it for me», which makes it meet a basic criterion of the dugnad
design.
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The opinion of biobank participants
In the focus group study with HUNT participants, we asked whether
biobank participation should be considered a legal obligation.11 Like the
researchers, none of the focus group participants thought this wholly
appropriate. Biobank research is conceived of as interfering with the pri-
vate, or autonomous, sphere of the citizen. To protect such a sphere is
viewed as fundamental to the Norwegian constitutional State, separating it
from totalitarian regimes. The ability to excuse oneself from participation
in HUNT based on religious views and views of bodily integrity is seen as
important. Making the right to health care somehow dependent on one’s
participation in medical research was definitely not endorsed by the focus
group participants, because of the observed right not to participate, as well
as the fact that everyone takes part in financing the universal Norwegian
health service by paying taxes.
The general line of thought, however, echoing the opinions of HUNT
researchers, is that even though a legal duty would be wrong, people should
feel a certain moral duty to take part in HUNT. Everybody should partici-
pate in HUNT, one man said, because «the ideal is of course that everybody
should contribute to the community, but then again you have the right to
decide when it comes to your personal stuff.» Generally, the interests of the
State and its citizens are perceived as identical when it comes to the aims of
biobank research: it is in everybody’s interest to promote health by impro-
ving our ability to prevent and treat diseases.
Biobank research is perceived as a low-risk way of participating in bene-
ficial medical research. The participants evidently have quite vague ideas of
the potential embodied in the research: perhaps their children or future
generations will benefit from HUNT.12 The motivation for their participa-
tion is altruistic and patriotic: They are proud to take part in a study for the
possible benefit of the whole world, and take pride in the fact that such an
altruistic project has been initiated by, and is being accomplished with the
massive participation of, people from their own county (Antonsen 2005:
104).
The importance of solidarity
The main elements in HUNT that constitute a dugnad can easily be identi-
fied. Even though it is different from a traditional dugnad in some respects,
it seems fair to say that HUNT is a dugnad, or at least it is a project in the
dugnad spirit. Does it or could it, however, have elements that are clearly
incompatible with being a dugnad?
The participants in our study were not asked to relate the concept of dug-
nad to biobank participation, but their answers concerning the importance
104     ETIKK I PRAKSIS NR. 2 2008
of taking part point to elements of the concept of the dugnad: participation
should not be a legal duty, nor should the question of participation be enti-
rely neutral in moral terms; participation should be morally laudable as a
positive voluntary commitment to contribute to the common good.
On the other hand, the participants saw commercialisation of biobank
research as a possible threat to this aspect of the endeavour. To make medi-
cine for the rich rather than the needy, and thereby to profit from the volun-
tary contributions of the inhabitants of Nord-Trøndelag, would be at odds
with the nature of the biobank project as they perceived it. This shows that
solidarity is an essential motive for participation in biobank research, and
that commercialisation might frustrate this motivation and fundamentally
alter the nature of the enterprise. This can be illustrated by comparing the
HUNT project to the story of the dugnad in Valdres involving the building
of a mountain hotel. With their goal of private profit, the Valdres hotel
entrepreneurs violated the dugnad principles of reciprocity and solidarity,
and therefore their framing of the project as a dugnad was illegitimate. In
the eyes of participants, taking advantage of the potentially commercial
aspect of biobanking would transform the project in an essential way: the
project would be about non-reciprocated private profit rather than the
mutual or common good, thereby exploiting participants if involvement
was to be presented as a dugnad.
Interestingly, the principles that HUNT participants regarded as both
essential to the legitimacy of the study and as threatened by commercialisa-
tion, are the same as the principles which the HUNT project has to adhere
to in order to qualify as a dugnad: HUNT must be in pursuit of the common
good in solidarity, from which all participants and their descendants
equally benefit. It is, however, important to note that commercialisation per
se is fully compatible with these principles, as long as commercial research
is incorporated into the system of research ethics committees,13 and if it
only accelerates certain fields of research in addition to, rather than instead
of, publicly funded research for the common good.
Normative recruitment and the Helsinki Declaration
According to the 2004 Helsinki Declaration14 (§5), the interests of the indi-
vidual should always precede those of the society: «The subject should be
informed of the right to abstain from participation in the study or to with-
draw consent to participate at any time without reappraisal.»(§10), and in
§11 it is stated: «When obtaining informed consent for the research project
the physician should be particularly cautious if the subject is in a dependent
relationship with the physician or may consent under duress.» Taken
together, these paragraphs seem to imply that all recruitment to medical
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research must be normatively neutral: in general one should never argue
that a person ought to forsake his or her own interests to participate in the
interests of future health care (§5), and in particular that he or she has a par-
ticular obligation to participate, given the relationship of dependence
between the person and the provision of health care (§10–11).15 As we have
seen, participants and researchers in HUNT firmly reject the idea of refu-
sing non-participants the same rights to future health care as the partici-
pants; Is the moral pressure of the dugnad model exactly what these para-
graphs are meant to exclude?
The principles of the Helsinki Declaration are meant both to secure the
autonomy of potential participants and to protect them from harm. As
touched upon above, the nature of biobank research makes the risk for phy-
sical harm negligible. The most important concern is thus to guarantee that
no one is deceived or coerced into taking part. The crucial question, then,
is whether and when normative recruitment implies the deception or coer-
cion of individuals, which would thereby make it illegitimate. Is it possible
to defend an ideal of free and informed decisions by all potential biobank
participants as to whether or not to take part, if participation in the research
project in question is presented as morally laudable or obligatory? Is it legi-
timate to appeal to the dugnad spirit in recruiting people to HUNT?
The Helsinki Declaration, John Harris and the HUNT participants all
agree that a fundamental principle of medical research is that participation
is voluntary, and that no one is invited to take part in research when there
is an unfavourable risk-benefit ratio. Given this, one starting point would be
to say that any medical research should identify the risks to and the interests
of the participants and society in the project, in order to be able to state
these dangers and interests clearly in the invitation to take part. It would
then be unethical for researchers to invite individuals to take part in a study
in which they did not think that those invited really should take part. In
other words, the researchers who invite people to take part in a project not
only generally have an interest in a high participation rate, but it is more
precise to say that also the researchers always should have an interest in a
high participation rate. Researchers should believe that it is in everybody’s
interest for everyone who is invited to choose to take part.
The dugnad analogy is demanding in its aim for a collective consensus
on the need for and legitimacy of the research, and the moral duty to take
part. The crucial point, however, is that this puts a normative pressure on
the invited participants and the project designers alike. To present a medical
research project as a dugnad should in general be done with extreme cau-
tion, as it is a strong rhetorical device that might blur reflections on perso-
nal risk, as well as the nature of the common good involved. To put a nor-
mative pressure on the participants in this way thus puts a huge normative
pressure on the research institution and the relevant governmental bodies.
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They have to ensure and be sure that a project meets the criteria of being a
dugnad. Only if these criteria are met is the invitation to take part in a rese-
arch dugnad valid, and only if these criteria are met is this use of normative
recruitment legitimate.
Given a transparent and informative process of voluntary recruitment, the
research institutions are dependent on the trust of potential participants. This
makes an appeal to the dugnad spirit a double-edged sword: if the research
projects are conceived by participants to rightly deserve the dugnad label, it
might improve the participation rate, but if the project in question is seen as
not deserving the dugnad label it might mean that the participants lose their
trust in the project altogether. The fear that this might happen partly explains
the reluctance of research institutes in Norway to invoke the dugnad spirit
explicitly in their official documents and invitations.16
Rather than being a simple way to recruit people for research, normative
recruitment is a demanding way to recruit volunteers for a transparent pro-
ject dependent on trust. Normative recruitment might nevertheless be a
way to make clear the mutual duties of a research-based health service, and
its potential patients and research participants. This might promote rather
than hamper the ability of participants to make an autonomous decision as
to whether or not they should take part, as prescribed by the Helsinki
Declaration. Normatively neutral recruitment might downplay ethical
aspects of the research, such as urgency and justice, because people are
simply invited in a neutral way and may participate if they wish. No one has
said that they should take part, so the motivation to autonomously question
the ethical aspects of the relevant research is significantly lower.
When normative recruitment is not justified
Appeals to participate in a dugnad and the dugnad spirit need to be justified
in the general design of a biobank such as HUNT. Appeals to participate in
a dugnad also need to be justified in specific projects using biobank mate-
rial, or in targeted biobank projects. How does a specific biobank research
project appear, if normative recruitment is not justified? The Norwegian
MIDIA research project on the environmental causes of type 1 diabetes is
illustrative in this respect.
The starting point for the MIDIA project was that people with a special
genotype have a higher risk of developing type 1 diabetes. Approximately
2% of the Norwegian population is in this group. In MIDIA, pregnant
women were invited to let their future newborn children take the genetic
test for type 1 diabetes. Subsequently, approximately 2000 «high risk» chil-
dren were expected to be identified. These children would then be followed
by researchers for c.15 years. Their mothers and fathers were asked to deli-
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ver faecal samples every month until the baby was 3 years old. In addition,
blood samples and questionnaires were to be delivered four times during
the first year and then once a year until the child reached the age of 15 years
(Rønningen et al. 2007: 2405).
Although MIDIA was huge, prestigious, with substantial national
governmental funding, and of international interest, it was found to violate
the Norwegian Biotechnology Act. After having identified c.1000 babies at
risk, MIDIA came to be seen as highly controversial by Norwegians. Parents
who were warned of an increased risk for their children based on the pre-
dictive genetic test expressed fear and anger about having this information.
From their perspective, the fantastic experience of having a baby was
tainted by the focus on a possible future disease, without any ability to pre-
vent it (Anonymous 2007: 1824). The Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory
Board considered the project in relation to the Biotechnology Act. They
concluded that the predictive genetic testing of children for diseases that
cannot be prevented is forbidden by Norwegian law (Foss 2007).
However, whether MIDIA was in accordance with Norwegian law or
not, is not the main point here. The importance lies in the incident as an
example of a research project putting substantial burdens on the shoulders
of the participant. In its invitation letter, MIDIA used a language of norma-
tive recruitment: «Congratulations on the birth of a newborn citizen! […]
It may seem early, but we would still like to invite you and your little new-
born citizen to make your first benevolent contribution to society.»17 The
invitation letter refers to citizenship, to the relationship between a citizen
and society, and to benevolent contributions and the common good. The
baby is referred to not as an individual but as a citizen, with the expression
of sentiments and ideas about what good citizenship and civic duties
amount to. As we have already made clear in this article, our argument is
not that this is principally wrong. Rather, we argue that the legitimacy of
this kind of normative recruitment presupposes certain kinds of research
designs – such as fulfilling the criteria for being a dugnad.
Our question is then: If the MIDIA project was more or less presented
as a dugnad – was it in accordance with a «dugnad design»? MIDIA revealed
the results of babies’ predictive genetic tests to their parents. As there are no
preventive measures available for type 1 diabetes, the information caused
psychological stress and worry for some parents. Some parents were given
information that they later wished they had rather stayed ignorant of. Thus,
the right not to know was neglected. The need to provide faecal samples,
blood tests and answer questionnaires on a continuous basis added to par-
ticipants’ inconvenience. For one 15-year-old MIDIA participant, there was
a 93% probability that she would not develop diabetes, and she would have
to live with the risk awareness for the rest of her life without being part of
any research project.
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In sum, it is easy to conclude that MIDIA did not have a dugnad design.
The inconvenience was substantive rather than negligible. It is not in accor-
dance with dugnad criteria to subject invited participants to severe incon-
venience or risk. In this respect, the empirical factors of the study design are
crucial for assessing the ethical question of the legitimacy of normative
recruitment. In the MIDIA case, implicit references to civic duties and
explicit references to citizenship and contributions to society functioned as
an illegitimate rhetorical device.
Accounts of duties
The aim of an account of duties to participate in medical research is to
provide a middle ground between asserting a general duty to take part in
medical research, and a general principle of normatively neutral recruit-
ment of participants – which implies that the potential participant should
not feel any obligation to take part. While a general duty is argued for on the
basis of a relationship of mutual duties between the health care provider and
recipient, normatively neutral recruitment is argued for on the basis of fun-
damental principles of medical research ethics.
Daniel Callahan, as we have shown, is dismissive of the argument that
we have a duty to conduct and participate in medical research in order to
benefit future generations, in the same way that preceding generations have
made our health care system possible. It follows, then, that he must hold
either that there never really was such a social contract between genera-
tions, or that we stand in a radically different relation to our descendants
concerning medical research than did our forebears. Both of these substan-
tial claims are rather controversial, and, as we have seen, have not been met
with approval among HUNT participants.
What seems to be more promising than generating controversy over a
general duty to participate in medical research is developing as accurately
as possible Rhodes and Harris’s sense of a prima facie moral obligation to
take part in medical research. Harris argued that people who do not parti-
cipate in research are freeriders who opt for the benefits from medical rese-
arch without making a contribution. Contrary to Harris’s argument, the
division of labour in modern society is a form of an organised system of
legitimate freeriders. This argument can be turned on its head, however.
Considerations of justice might be deemed relevant for individuals specifi-
cally called upon to participate in this division of labour, as in the HUNT
case. Infinite duties are then transformed into socially finite and perfect
ones if part of a well-organised and limited system of medical research, such
as the one described in Rhodes’s «novel proposal».
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However, rather than just asserting a general duty to participate in such
a system of research, the dugnad analogy illustrates the need for a descrip-
tion of how such a duty presupposes specific conditions regarding the rese-
arch design. The research design has to meet conditions concerning both
the nature of the involvement of the individual in terms of beneficence and
non-maleficence. Furthermore, it also has to make clear its contribution to
the creation of the common good. The dugnad model presupposes a sensi-
tivity and openness for debate on whether and how the research design
actually promotes the creation of the common good, as conceived in the
community in question. Pace the purely apolitical accounts of duties of rese-
arch participation promoted by Harris and Rhodes, this points to a justifi-
cation of normative recruitment which is sensitive to politics.
Citizenship and the ethics of belonging
Our discussion of the HUNT case as analogous to a dugnad has shown that
talking about moral obligations to participate in medical research essenti-
ally involves detailed descriptions of the research in question, including
aspects such as its organisation, its aims, its beneficiaries, its potential, its
urgency, and of belonging and membership. The discussion of whether
potential participants have a perfect or an imperfect duty to participate in
medical research on the basis of a limited description of the research invol-
ved is not very promising. It is difficult to make a plausible case by asserting
an individual’s general duty to participate. A limited description of the rele-
vant research also does a poor job of describing the moral motivation to take
part in specific research projects.
A nuanced and situated description of the normative basis for individual
participation in collective projects is vital to the discussion of moral moti-
vations and obligations in this field. The dugnad analogy introduced in the
HUNT case shows this in an illustrative way. People take part in dugnad not
just as individuals but as members of a community. Their motivation is
neither purely altruistic nor purely egoistic. It is more about a sense of
belonging on different levels: We belong to a society where health is a com-
mon good. We belong to a patient group or a local community that may
make a difference regarding health for future generations. In this way we are
members of communities that involve a kind of civic duty to participate. As
members, or citizens, the right thing to do is to participate. In this respect it
might be said to be a kind of patriotic act, in Charles Taylor’s sense, because
it
[…] transcends egoism in the sense that people are really attached to the common
good, to general liberty. But it is quite unlike the apolitical attachment to universal
principle that the stoics advocated or that is central to modern ethics of rule by law.
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The difference is that patriotism is based on identification with others in a particular
common enterprise. […] Patriotism is somewhere between friendship or family
feeling, on one side, and altruistic dedication on the other. (Taylor 1995: 188)
In this way, patriotism can be viewed as highly relevant for participation in
medical research.
Patriotism and dugnad thus go hand in hand. This could imply a «poli-
tisation» of science, yet there is nothing wrong with that. Rather, the oppo-
site is true: when medical research is «politicised» through concepts such as
citizenship, community, belonging, and patriotism, the question is also rai-
sed regarding the direction and development the relevant community and
research project should be headed towards. Opposition to biobank research
is typically a political one, like the critique of biobank research representing
a «geneticisation» of medical research – shifting the focus away from social
inequality and health to a focus on genetic explanations. Such opposition
does not lead to less civic engagement, but rather more. This challenges
research communities for certain research projects to be able to defend nor-
mative recruitment, and to make an appeal to the common good.
Conclusions
The dugnad analogy offers the opportunity to understand how a specific
research project should be designed to support an asserted moral obligation
to take part. Ignorable risk, ignorable inconvenience and a common good
that addresses each person as a member of a community rather than just as
an individual, are core elements in the dugnad design. Normative recruit-
ment should be seen as legitimate in these cases. That the criteria essential
to the legitimacy of HUNT coincides with the criteria to qualify as a dugnad
shows the potential suitability of such an approach.18
Normative recruitment is a powerful rhetorical device. Medical research
is not in general a dugnad, and normative recruitment is not in general legi-
timate. An important message of this article is to suggest that as early as
possible in the design phase of a project, researchers should reflect on the
relationship of their project to the community of potential participants and
to the common good. This will imply a «politicisation» of medical resear-
chers – but that would be for the better. Ethics separated from politics is
anaemic. Aanaemic ethics for biobanking benefits neither biobank research
nor the participants.
   When is normative recruitment legitimate? 111
Lars Øystein Ursin and Berge Solberg
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Nancy Bazilchuk, Bjørn Hofmann, Bjørn
Myskja, Rune Nydal, John-Arne Skolbekken, Jan-Helge Solbakk, and two
anonymous reviewers from the Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics for their
valuable comments on and linguistic improvements to this article. All
translations from Norwegian have been made by Lars Øystein Ursin and
Berge Solberg.
Notes
1 Cf. Brassington 2007, Beauchamp 2005; London 2005; McGuire & McCulloch 2005;
Sharp & Yarborough 2005; Sharpsay & Pimple 2007; Wachbroit & Wasserman 2005.
2 In order to show that non-participants are freeriders, Harris needs to show that in
declining to take part, non-participants actually hamper the research in a decisive
way. Chan and Harris compare non-participation in research with non-participati-
on in immunisation (Chan & Harris 2008: 4). Their analogy is flawed, however, since
the non-participation of only some individuals disrupts herd immunity but not re-
search opportunity. We will suggest a better way to view how the principle of fairness
relates to biobank participation later in this chapter.
3 Chan and Harris also seem to tend toward viewing the obligation in question as im-
perfect: «How much money ‘should’ you give to charity or to good causes, how hard
should you work to discharge your obligation to your employer? The absence of a de-
finable answer to this question does not make giving to charity or doing a fair day’s
work any less of a moral good, neither does the problem of how much research is
enough invalidate the obligation to pursue it.» (Chan & Harris 2008: 10). Both here,
and in their blunt statement «there is an obligation to support all sorts of public
goods» (Chan & Harris 2008: 5), it is hard to make sense of their view if the notion
of obligation implied is the perfect one.
4 HUNT is a Norwegian acronym for the «Health Study of Nord-Trøndelag» (Helse-
undersøkelsen i Nord-Trøndelag)
5 See, for instance, Gunnar Bovim in ‘Sikkert som biobanken?’ in Adresseavisen, 20
July 2001, and in ‘Har overtatt verdens største helseundersøkelse’ in Universitetsavi-
sa, No. 1, 2001, p. 12, Steinar Krokstad in ‘Ønsker flere «pasienter» til Hunt 3’ in
Namdalsavisa 12 May 2008, and in ‘HUNT, nordtrønderne og helsedugnaden’ in
Trønderavisa 18 September 2004, and Stig Slørdahl in ‘Hard trening mest effektivt’,
in Levanger-avisa, 15 December 2005, and in ‘Store innskudd i ny biobank’ in Uni-
versitetsavisa, 15 February 2007
6 Wikipedia is available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page It is the lar-
gest free encyclopaedia in the world, and invites readers to contribute and edit exis-
ting entries.
7 For a discussion of relevant aspects of the deCode project, see Palsson & Hardardot-
tir 2002
8 The focus group participants comprised of people who had given their consent to
participate in the HUNT biobank (5 groups), former participants who had with-
drawn their consent to take part in the biobank (3 groups), and researchers who were
involved in or had an interest in HUNT (5 groups). The groups were recruited with
the help of HUNT biobank. The focus group sessions took place in the autumn of
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2004 and the spring of 2005. The five discussion themes of the focus groups were: 1.
The use (and abuse) of the biobank material; 2. Their own decision for giving con-
sent/not giving consent, and the appropriateness of different kinds of consent; 3.
Duty versus autonomy in biobank research participation; 4. The ethical and practical
consequences of conducting genetic research versus other kinds of medical research
in HUNT; and 5. Commercialisation of the biobank research. The focus group par-
ticipants discussed (rather freely) questions concerning the use of general consent
concerning biobank participation, the adequacy of a putative duty to take part, the
ethical consequences of commercial use of HUNT biobank material, and their gene-
ral hopes and fears concerning the biobank research carried out by HUNT. The fo-
cus group study was designed by two ethicists (Berge Solberg and Lars Øystein
Ursin) and a social scientist (John Arne Skolbekken), who also was the group mode-
rator. For a presentation of further aspects of the focus group study, see Skolbekken
et al. (2005).
9 MIDIA is a Norwegian abbreviation for «Environmental causes of type 1 diabetes»
(Miljøårsaker til type 1 diabetes).
10 Cf. Collins (of UK Biobank) in Petersen (2006: 491). 
11 Cf. Skolbekken et al. (2005).
12 Cf. Skolbekken et al. (2005: 340).
13 Cf. also Kettis-Lindblad (2005).
14 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects. Available at www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm
Accessed 2008–09–24
15 Ibid.
16 Similarly, the Governmental Regional Research Ethics Committees does not readily
approve of the use of normative words such as dugnad in research recruitment.
17 Cf. www.fhi.no/dav/D651 389BCD.pdf Accessed August 2008.
18 The dugnad concept might be said to be more than just a model or an analogy – it
might be argued that the HUNT study is indeed a dugnad, and not just possible to
view as a dugnad.
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